Defense ministers and other officials from all 31 nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gather between July 11–12 in Vilnius, Lithuania, for a meeting that could define the 75-year-old alliance’s next century.
On tap is NATO’s first updated battle plan since the fall of the Soviet Union, a discussion about membership funding levels, Sweden’s proposed entry, and clarifications on “pathways” for Ukraine to join while drawing support from individual member nations, but not the alliance itself, in its war to repel Russia’s invasion.
And while no one from the Ukrainian government has been officially invited to attend, “Ukraine will be the most important item on the summit agenda next week,” said Sean Monaghan, a Visiting Fellow on Europe, Russia, and Eurasia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Mr. Monaghan made the comment during a 90-minute July 6 “virtual discussion” on NATO defense and deterrence in Washington.
“The point of all this is—strengthening NATO’s defense and deterrence helps Ukraine and NATO allies,” he said, noting Ukraine’s limbo NATO status “enables NATO allies to help Ukraine, to provide military assistance kind of without fear of reprisal, so a strong defense in NATO’s interests is in Ukraine’s interests” and vice-versa.
Much of the presentation focused on the revised NATO battle plan, its first update since the 1980s, and the CSIS launch of a new report, “Repel, Don’t Expel: Strengthening NATO’s Defense and Deterrence in the Baltic States” by Mr. Monaghan and CSIS International Security Program Senior Adviser Mark F. Cancian.
But the questions about Ukraine’s entry into NATO, in limbo since 2008, and Sweden’s more recent request for admission are certain to generate the most attention during the summit.
Ukraine Not Invited To Summit
Eastern European member nations want the summit to produce “a road map” that plots concrete steps Ukraine can take to enroll in NATO.
Specifically, they support a British proposal that would clarify vagaries in a Membership Action Plan the alliance crafted for Ukraine in 2008.
That plan said Kyiv would become a member, eventually, but did not include a formal invitation nor a timetable for when it would be enrolled.
Others in the alliance, including the United States and Germany, maintain such an overt overture now could be counter-productive in convincing Russia that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is not a security threat to Moscow.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly said he opposes any consideration during the summit of Ukraine joining the alliance while it is at war with Russia.
In fact, NATO has not even issued a formal invitation for the Ukrainian government to send representatives to the gathering.
Nevertheless, there will be “some who are very eager for the Vilnius summit to make some kind of commitment to Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership,” Hudson Institute Keystone Defense Initiative Senior Fellow and director Rebeccah Heinrichs said.
“I still think that is really too premature,” she said.
“I don’t think that the NATO alliance is sufficiently bold enough now—in insisting that Ukraine win—and, I think, until Ukraine gets Russia out of its territory and regains its territory, discussions about Ukraine joining NATO are simply premature.”
“This is pretty simple—there’s too much uncertainty not to hedge” on Ukraine’s 2008 NATO admission request, agreed former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy Michael C. Ryan.
“So the right strategy here is to hedge,” he continued. “You know, there is uncertainty about the battlefield situation in Ukraine. There is uncertainty about Mr. Putin in his decision-making abilities, uncertainty about the fragility of his regime.
“And if you’re in a situation of uncertainty, hedging is the best strategy.”
Israel-Type Security Assurance For Ukraine
But there are things NATO can be certain of, Mr. Ryan said.
“There’s not much uncertainty about a few things. [With] Mr. Putin, the gloves are off,” he said, calling Russia “a violent revisionist state” that NATO, European Union, and the United States must contend with by building a layered, integrated defense—which begins by helping Ukraine in its war with Russia.
NATO leaders are expected to discuss security assurances for Ukraine although the pledges will come from individual nations and not the alliance itself.
Mr. Ryan said those security assurances and military assistance need to be coordinated in a way that assumes Ukraine will eventually be a NATO member or, at least, an ally of the alliance.
“What I would expect to see, what I hope to see—that doesn’t mean it’s going to happen—is an acceleration of the mechanisms to transform the Ukrainian military into a NATO military,” he said.
“In other words, to deepen the level of planning cooperation, to deepen the industrial defense cooperation, so that we can start to transform the Ukrainian defense industry into a more Western, more modern defense industry so that they’re able to produce the types of NATO interoperable equipment they will need on the day that they do become members after they are victorious in the war.”
Mr. Monaghan said in terms of the United States’ sustained commitment to Ukraine, he could not say if it would resemble “Israel type” of guarantees but it would best sustained by the American-led Ukraine defense contact group and remain “outside of NATO structures.”
Turkey Still Objects To Sweden
For a decade, Turkey has maintained Sweden provides asylum, and a “free operating environment,” for dissidents it classifies as terrorists.
These include members of a religious group, the Gülen movement, that Turkey maintains tried to stage a 2016 coup to overthrow the Erdogan government, and Kurdish militants engaged in an insurgency against Turkey.
Turkey’s anger with Sweden over its asylum policies became an issue when the Swedes, after more than 200 years of unaffiliated neutrality, formally requested to join NATO in May 2022. All 31 member states must agree to admit new members.
Ankara, citing Sweden’s asylum policies, has objected to its admission into NATO. Hungary has also opposed Sweden’s entry in protest over corruption fines and other sanctions levied against it by the European Union.
To address Turkey’s issues, Sweden has agreed to extradite alleged terrorists wanted by the Turks, although several have been delayed by court rulings.
Sweden has also amended its Constitution and hardened counterterrorism laws in a slate of newly adopted measures that went into effect on June 1.
Mr. Stoltenberg conferred with foreign ministers and officials from Turkey, Sweden, and Finland in Brussels, Belgium, on July 6.
“We all agreed we have made good progress,” he told reporters. “We all want to complete this process as soon as possible.”
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said during another July 6 news conference that changes in Sweden’s antiterrorism law must now be put into action.
Hungary Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto told reporters on July 4 that if the Turkish position changed, Hungary would not obstruct the process any further.
Mr. Stoltenberg said he will meet with Mr. Erdogan and Sweden Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson to make a last-minute pitch for Swedish membership at the summit.
Mr. Erdogan can then seek parliamentary ratification in Turkey.
Whether Turkey’s objections can be resolved is “the million dollar question of the summit,” Mr. Monaghan said. “The ball is in Erdogan’s court. I don’t think anybody really knows the answer.”
Ms. Heinrichs noted some believed Mr. Erdogan would be more amenable to allowing Sweden into the alliance following the consensus and his recent reelection, but that doesn’t appear to be happening.
“I was never really all that optimistic that Erdogan would … after the election” withdraw the objections and that “Sweden will easily kind of sail through,” she said.
“I’m typically sort of the Midwestern optimist but I was like, ‘I don’t know. I don’t know.’ He’s still probably going to try to squeeze out more concessions from the alliance” before confirming Sweden.
Mr. Monaghan said rejecting Sweden’s entry “would be a big failure for NATO” in its efforts to counter Russia, especially in The Baltic.
But “on the other hand,” he said, it would show NATO is a true alliance “based on consensus. That’s almost NATO’s unique selling point.
“And this demonstrates that consensus and action, that NATO respects differing views of all 31—hopefully, soon to be 32—members and this is playing out in public and that’s a strength for NATO, not a weakness.”
Nevertheless, Mr. Monaghan said in reference to Sweden’s entry, “Let’s hope it gets done by Vilnius.”
