The Ugly Reality on the Ground in Syria

The latest episode of violence in Syria has its roots in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Assad dynasty, according to sources on the ground who spoke to The American Conservative. Their comments contradict the narrative that remnants of the former regime are responsible for the bloodshed. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States and the West in general to conduct a broad, serious, and unpoliticized assessment of the situation, and refrain from taking any steps that serve to empower the new regime in Damascus. In particular, the U.S. must not be deceived by attempts to frame the conflict as a means of countering Iran.

Many mainstream media outlets embraced the new Syrian government’s account that the recent bloodshed was in response to an ambush carried out by Assad loyalists that led to the death of 13 members of the Syrian state security services near the coastal city of Latakia. This narrative is also being propagated by the expert community in Washington. A policy analysis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy—widely seen as an authoritative voice on the Middle East—faulted the State Department for not mentioning that “regime remnants triggered the killing”.

Accounts from the ground, however, tell a different story. According to a source who spoke to TAC from Latakia, the attack on the state security services came after months of provocations against the Alawite sect. This, he said, included the kidnapping of soldiers that had served under the former regime but had not participated in any attacks on civilians.

“Nine thousand military personnel who had taken part in the battles against ISIS, 99 percent of whom are Alawites, were kidnapped whilst unarmed on the same day that the (former) regime fell,” said the source, who requested not to be named for security reasons.

The new Syrian leadership, he added, did not live up to its pledge of granting amnesty for soldiers of the former regime that had no involvement in acts of violence against civilians.

Other provocations included artillery and drone attacks on rural impoverished Alawite villages.

Meanwhile, according to this account, no armed support was provided by Iran or any other foreign party, and the weapons used by the inhabitants of the coastal areas belonged to former soldiers. Per the source, it was only after no ammunition was left, and not because of the ambush, that pro-government forces launched the crackdown.

“After those who were defending their dignity ran out of ammunition people went back home because there is no foreign support, then every Islamic extremist capable of carrying a weapon from within and outside Syria proceeded to head to the coastal areas,” the source said.

Syrian authorities described the violence against civilians as isolated incidents, while pledging to launch a probe and hold accountable those involved in violations.

Footage and images out of Syria, however, seem to contradict the claims of isolated incidents and point to systematic ethnic cleansing against the Alawite sect. These images—some of which were sent directly to TAC—show piles of bodies and women mourning.

The number of victims also indicates that what took place goes far beyond isolated incidents. Of the more than 1,000 people killed in the bloodshed, most were Alawite civilians. 

Even opponents of the Assad regime have described what took place in terms of genocide. Director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Rami Abdul-Rahman called on the international community to “differentiate between preventing the resurgence of Iran and regime remnants and the genocide of Alawite civilians.”

Most concerning for Washington is that the systematic targeting of Alawites is consistent with the goals of ISIS, which reserves a special hatred for minorities and Shiites in particular. While Alawites are distinct from Shiites, they are often considered part of the same category. Video footage and images obtained by TAC from sources in Syria show militants wearing a uniform displaying the ISIS black flag symbol. (TAC cannot independently verify the authenticity of this footage.) The possibility of ISIS remnants being absorbed into or employed by the Syrian state security services must therefore be taken seriously. 

The accumulated evidence is serious enough that the Trump administration should resist actions that would effectively empower the new regime in Damascus, not least because this may end up empowering ISIS. Some such calls have come from prominent figures in the Washington “expert community.” 

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, published just prior to the massacres of the Alawites, America’s former ambassador to Damascus, Robert Ford—seen as one of Washington’s finest on Syrian issues—called for teaming up with the new Syrian leadership to fight ISIS. Among the recommendations put forward by Ford was possible intelligence cooperation with the new HTS regime.

Aggression from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against Arab civilians, he argues, is one of factors that disqualify the SDF from continuing to be Washington’s main partner in the fight against ISIS. On the other hand, Ford paints a rather rosy picture of HTS, including its treatment of Christians in Idlib. (An agreement has now been reached between the new regime and the SDF to integrate the Kurdish forces into the new Syrian national army.)

The unfortunate timing of this article brings to mind the debacle surrounding former national security advisor Jake Sullivan’s rosy picture of the Middle East published less than a week before Hamas and other Palestinian factions launched Operation Al-Aqsa Storm against Israel. Ironically, Sullivan also made this assessment in Foreign Affairs.

That Ford catastrophically appears to have misread the situation is all the more reason why any advice from the traditional “expert community” should be ignored by Trump 2.0.

It is also likely not lost on Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa that senior American officials have shown a tendency to tolerate and even depict Salafist jihadis in Syria (groups like HTS) as allies. In fact, Sharaa experienced this firsthand when an email exchange exposed by Wikileaks in early 2012 revealed that Sullivan—who was a senior aide at the time to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton—opined to his boss that “Al-Qaeda is on our side in Syria.” Sharaa was the leader of Al-Qaeda in Syria at the time under his pseudonym “Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.”

The rationale behind Sullivan’s argument was a classic case of “the enemy of my enemy is friend.” In other words, Assad was the greater enemy, and his demise, by whatever force, was a good thing. The hostility towards Assad was largely due to the Assad dynasty’s long-standing alliance with Iran, which remains America’s number one regional foe.

Sharaa’s apparent implicit reference to Iranian involvement in the latest bloodshed in Syria must be met with extreme caution. It would not be unreasonable to suspect that the new Syrian leader may be playing the Iran card once more to gain the legitimacy he is seeking from Washington, especially given Trump’s anti-Iranian track record. Trump 2.0 would be wise not fall into such a trap.